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INTRODUCTION:
THREE COHORTS’ VULNERABILITIES
ON THE ISSUE OF SEXUAL CONSENT
ANITA BERNSTEIN*
Getting to write this introduction to an octet of stimulating Articles is the
second honor I received at this Symposium. 1 In October 2019, I joined the
live event as a panel moderator. Both of these occasions—panel moderation
then, synthesis now—have brought elegant and stimulating diversity to my
tasks. Dividing the variation into subgroups that each unite around a theme
had to be done at the live event, and now returns in this Introduction as I
frame eight works that started as presentations in the Bell Courtroom in
Norman, Oklahoma and are now Articles.
Erin Sheley, leader of the Symposium, arranged the nine October 2019
presentations into three panels, a familiar number. American legal
education features many threes. Most students go to law school for that
number of years, and take mostly three-credit courses in a calendar that for
most of us has three seasons: fall semester, spring semester, and summer. 2
We nine authors in the Symposium are law professors, a group tasked with
the tripartite job description of teaching, scholarship, and service. 3
Panel 1, on higher education, had the narrowest focus of the October
event. Titled “Where We Learn: Title IX and Sexual Assault,” it featured
* Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. The original nonet was equally stimulating.
2. Exceptions like an occasional quarter system “prove the rule” in the sense of
underscoring its dominance.
3. I find myself threeing all the time. Over three (3) decades of law teaching I’ve
discussed and lectured on several doctrinal tests that have three elements needed for a
plaintiff to prevail. Some of them arise in a field that features three types of tortious conduct.
Another subject I teach has three types of product defects. Family Law in my classroom
examines marriage by looking first at entry into this relation, then at regulation of the
ongoing marriage, and lastly at divorce. For threesomes in my writings, see ANITA
BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 171 (2018) [hereinafter
BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW] (reading Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to find “two
trinities” in it: “three segments to each pregnancy” and “three sets of interests to be balanced
against one another”); Anita Bernstein, Treble Damages in New York: A Field Guide,
N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 13, 2017, 2:02 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/
1202783664927/treble-damages-in-new-york-a-field-guide/ (“Plaintiffs who prevail in court
can collect extra money—more than compensatory damages, that is—by three different
means.”).

1
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Hannah Brenner Johnson, Erin Buzuvis, and Sarah Swan. The other two
panels offered wider-ranging conversations. Panel 2, “Between Yesterday
and Tomorrow: Change and Conflict in the Legal Discourse Around Sex
Offenses,” included presentations from Kelly Behre, Donald Dripps, and
one no longer here. Panel 3, which I had the privilege of moderating, “In
the Boardroom and Beyond: Consent in the Institutional Context,” brought
together Russell Christopher, Shawn Fields, and Erin Sheley.
In this introduction I offer a somewhat different arrangement of the
Articles, a 2-2-4. This re-division is not a disagreement or superimposition
with the layout that worked so well last fall but a second look that presents
a thesis. In the array I offer here, eight Articles converge and divide around
three vulnerabilities.
I use “vulnerabilities” plural rather than vulnerability singular because
each of the groups I identify here is exposed to the possibility of a distinct
category of harm with respect to sexual assault,4 the issue that occupies this
Symposium. Different dangers threaten different groups and individuals.
Each of these very different eight Articles works to highlight one cohort’s
perspective or vulnerability.
The First Cohort: Persons Vulnerable to Sexual Predation
Erin Sheley and Shawn Fields have put at center stage persons
vulnerable to sexual predation. Professor Sheley writes about statements
that describe victim impacts,5 Professor Fields about dress codes for
students in grade school.6 While both authors have girls and young women
in mind, they write about these protagonists with attention to different
traits.
Sheley wades into the controversial waters of victim impact statements
by finding a new place for them in claims of injury brought against
institutional defendants. Narratives from persons who have suffered sexual
abuse that they attribute to institutional wrongdoing “have the potential to
4. I occasionally use “rape” as an approximate synonym for sexual assault and
criminal sexual conduct, aware that for decades the word rape has been ebbing in codified
crimes. See Wendy Rae Willis, The Gun Is Always Pointed: Sexual Violence and Title III of
the Violence Against Women Act, 80 GEO. L.J. 2197, 2199 n.23 (1992) (reporting the same
authorial choice).
5. Erin Sheley, Victim Impact Statements and Corporate Sex Crimes, 73 OKLA. L. REV.
209 (2020).
6. Shawn E. Fields, Institutionalizing Consent Myths in Grade School, 73 OKLA. L.
REV. 173 (2020).
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serve a unique purpose: to transmit to the public the lived reality of
something that may not seem intellectually plausible: sexual assault by an
entity.”7
Retellings of a bad experience are thought of as communicating pain, but
they also communicate power—by which Sheley means not the eloquence
of a narrative but the rawer power that an institution has over a person.
Sheley notes victims’ “comparative helplessness relative to a company.” 8
Impact statements end up saying more than just Here’s how I was hurt.
They limn an otherwise abstract offender whose “continued temporal
existence” is central to its capacity to do harm.9
Continuing this attention to persons vulnerable to sexual predation,
Fields argues that “seemingly innocuous modesty-based dress codes” used
in many American grade schools “perpetuate a male-centric system of
implied consent and general entitlement to sexual conduct.” 10 School
administrators who impose this regulation tend to defend it as a distractionreducer that shelters young people from crashing waves of hormones. But
even if dress codes increase levels of attention paid to the official
curriculum—a claim that in my view should not be credited until it gets
support from controlled studies, a politically infeasible prospect—they also
bring in trouble:
This rationale . . . tells boys that it is “the girl’s responsibility to
cover up, and if she doesn’t it’s her fault he got distracted” . . .
[and it also] tells girls that they are responsible for preventing
this irresistible urge of the opposite sex, and that it is their fault
for dressing so provocatively if boys gaze, leer, whistle, catcall,
or touch. As one dress code critic noted, this approach serves as
a microcosm of “a culture that’s so used to looking at issues of
harassment and assault through the wrong end of the telescope,”
directed at “girls’ own clothing” rather than the kind of sexually
predatory behavior directed at girls.” 11
A second-order defense of gendered dress codes that interests Fields
holds that compulsory modesty functions to liberate schoolgirls. 12
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Sheley, supra note 5, at 226.
Id. at 221.
Id.
Fields, supra note 6, at 177.
Id. at 187 (citations omitted).
Id. at 180, 183.
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Exploring the familiar idea that chains can set people free, critics have been
observing for years that lately (in contrast to the more innocent earlier time
they think they remember) a girl is pressed to look sexy and the age at
which this pressure starts is now alarmingly low. 13 Fields does not deny this
conventional wisdom; he complicates it. His Article reminds readers that
clothes cover the surface of a human being—a person, not (just) a
distraction-unit or provocation or trouble-stirrer.14 Our heroine could chafe
at being forced into sackcloth. She might “want to dress provocatively to
attract attention from a particular person, be it a boyfriend or girlfriend, or
simply a love interest,” Fields observes. 15 When she has this desire and acts
on it, recall the Symposium theme of consent: “Inviting a consensual
response from that singular individual . . . does not mean that she has
granted general consent to all people in the public sphere.”16
Persons vulnerable to sexual predation bring ideas and feelings and
wishes and experiences to the law. Sheley and Fields do not portray the
girls and women in their Articles as necessarily correct, or always innocent
in the sense of empty, blank, devoid. These individuals take actions for
which they have reasons. They make an impact not only on the law but on
the people around them and the institutions in which they live, work, and
learn.
The Second Cohort: Persons Vulnerable to Accusations
of Sexual Predation
Just as Erin Sheley and Shawn Fields do not idealize persons vulnerable
to sexual predation, the Articles in this second of three divisions do not
idealize those who are vulnerable to accusations of sexual assault. Donald
Dripps and Russell Christopher care about the harm of sexual predation;
they do not categorically question or disbelieve accusations that it occurred.
To this reader at least, their attention to accused persons demonstrates the
value of the symposium as a unit of legal scholarship in contrast to a
solitary article, the monad that could have been published by itself. These
pieces join a larger dialogue. I arrange Professor Dripps first in my
13. Another October, a friend of mine sighed to me that Halloween costumes for young
women she sees on offer “these days” seem limited to “slutty nurse, slutty French maid,
slutty Harry Potter.”
14. Fields, supra note 6, at 186.
15. Id. at 201.
16. Id.
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sequence because it is he who reminds us most explicitly why we readers
must heed the interests of accused persons.
Sexual assault violates codified law, Dripps writes, and “criminal
statutes ought to respect the legal virtues—fair warning, constraint of
discretion, and neutral determinations of wrongfulness ex ante.”17 Lack of
consent, when included among the elements of a sexual-assault crime,
raises the doctrinal and jurisprudential problem of vagueness: “Major areas
of legal uncertainty include what the scope of consent, if given, may be, and
what inducements other than force or threat of force make assent or
acquiescence different from consent as used in the statute. The literature
abounds with examples, many of them nothing but purely hypothetical.” 18
Reformers who find progressive potential in relative newcomers like
“affirmative consent” and “no means no,” Dripps argues, face challenges of
drafting and line-drawing when they write these ideals into law. 19
Carefully reviewing decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court as well as
rape cases adjudicated at the state level, Dripps finds dangers of both underand over-prosecution in rape cases where consent is at issue. Dripps
acknowledges that one danger is more prevalent than the other: “In the real
world, criminal justice actors are far more likely to reject meritorious rape
prosecutions than to press the envelope of statutory liability.”20 Void for
vagueness as a doctrine, however, condemns arbitrary discretion no matter
which way it cuts.21
Stakes of over-prosecution also emerge in the Article by Russell
Christopher. Writing about positive autonomy, Christopher highlights the
choice to engage in a sexual act as a source of satisfaction for oneself. 22
Consent as a constituent of rape law focuses on the negative kind of
autonomy, the right to refuse and reject. 23 Professor Christopher introduces
17. Donald A. Dripps, Due Process Overbreadth? The Void for Vagueness Doctrine,
Fundamental Rights, and the Brewing Storm Over Undefined Consent in Sexual Assault
Statutes, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 121, 158 (2020).
18. Id. at 147.
19. Id. at 154–56.
20. Id. at 149.
21. Id.
22. Russell Christopher, Unconditional Coercion and Positive Autonomy, 73 OKLA. L.
REV. 159, 160–61 (2020).
23. I share Professor Christopher’s keen interest in autonomy, although I focus more on
the negative stripe. In my book about it, I call the object of my attentive negative liberty
rather than negative autonomy because to my mind “liberty” makes helpful reference to the
power of the state. BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3, at 7–8; cf. RONALD
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positive autonomy with horrific facts found in a decision by the California
Court of Appeal, People v. Hooker:
[A] husband and wife kidnapped the adult victim at knifepoint
and held her captive. The victim was held naked, bound, gagged,
blindfolded, and chained to a bed. After several years of
continuing captivity, the husband began having intercourse with
the victim. Undoubtedly, one would believe the horrendous
conditions sufficiently undermined the victim’s capacity to
consent.24
The Hooker husband-defendant would not have obtained the acquiescence
he received if he hadn’t first violated the negative autonomy of his “adult
victim.” Pre-intercourse acts done by Cameron Hooker were uncommon:
Few people (I presume) kidnap another person at knifepoint and chain their
captive gagged and blindfolded to a bed. But once his deviant preintercourse actus rei were behind him, Mr. Hooker moved to sexual
conduct that from the outside looks close to ordinary. Christopher locates in
Hooker a paradox wherein “factual consent under adverse conditions that
have become institutionalized or normalized may constitute legal

DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 4 (2011) (defining liberty as covering “that part of your
freedom that government would do wrong to constrain”). I have contended that positive
liberty is less important than negative liberty. BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW, supra note 3,
at 35 (“[T]he common law does not address our unmet needs for good things. Instead it
heeds and honors our objections, resistances, and protests.”).
Closer to Christopher’s point, I have also noted that the common law “cares nothing
about the utility that a human being might hold as a sexual receptacle for another person, or
the possibility that venturesome traveling into the geography of someone else might be more
commendable than a closed-off refusal to consider an offer of penetration.” Id. at 141.
24. Christopher, supra note 22, at 161 (footnotes omitted) (citing People v. Hooker, 244
Cal. Rptr. 337, 338–39 (Ct. App. 1988) (depublished)). The Hooker facts are uglier than
Christopher’s summary indicates. Rather than mention them all, I quote below one passage
from the decision that reports some of what Cameron Hooker did to the victim, a young
woman named Colleen:
During this time, Hooker regularly practiced bondage on Colleen, suspending
her from the rafters, constricting her breathing, whipping her, keeping her head
encased in the headbox, tying her to the rack, shocking her with electrical
cords, burning her pubic area with a heat lamp, and immersing her in the
bathtub until she was unable to breathe. Colleen once estimated that Hooker
hung her and whipped her 90 to 100 times in the first six months.
Hooker, 244 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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consent.”25 Both the initiator and the target of his initiative live under these
conditions.26 Sharing with one’s aggressor a “lifeworld,” 27 the set of
material and political circumstances that no one can entirely exit or tune
out, has an impact on what a recipient of sexual initiative wants.
Christopher ascribes a point of view to the famed feminist scholar
Catharine MacKinnon: Those aforementioned social conditions make it
difficult, perhaps impossible, to say whether a woman has consented to an
act of sexual intercourse with a man. 28 To put the point of view in front of
us, I’ll quote a different passage from an early article.
Women, says MacKinnon, are
violated every day by men who have no idea of the meaning of
their acts to women. To them, it is sex. Therefore, to the law, it is
sex. That is the single reality of what happened. When a rape
prosecution is lost on a consent defense, the woman has not only
failed to prove lack of consent, she is not considered to have
been injured at all. Hermeneutically unpacked, read: because he
did not perceive she did not want him, she was not violated. She
had sex. Sex itself cannot be an injury. Women consent to sex
every day. Sex makes a woman a woman. Sex is what women
are for.29

25. Christopher, supra note 22, at 165.
26. For acknowledgment that my diction is awkward, see Anita Bernstein, The
Communities That Make Standards of Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 736–37 n.6
(2002) [hereinafter Bernstein, Communities]; Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the
Law of Aggression, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2001) [hereinafter Bernstein, Aggression]. I
thank Sarah Swan for her stimulating insights about the diction problem.
27. “The lifeworld is the unproblematic, taken-for-granted setting in which actors are
located spatially, temporally, and socially. . . . Actors interpret and define their situation, and
formulate their plans, in reliance upon a ‘stock of knowledge’—socially conditioned and
transmitted, and differentially distributed among a society’s members.” Hugh Baxter, System
and Lifeworld in Habermas’s Theory of Law, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 473, 511–12 (2002)
(footnotes omitted) (citing 2 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM : A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON 124–25 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1987) (1981); ALFRED SCHUTZ & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE STRUCTURES
OF THE LIFEWORLD 3–6, 19, 35–92, 113–16, 122, 124–25, 304–18 (Richard M. Zaner & H.
Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. trans., 1973)).
28. Christopher, supra note 22, at 170–71.
29. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635, 652–53 (1983).
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At the live version of this Symposium, Christopher wove this perspective
together with a strand from the dystopian novel The Handmaid’s Tale. The
protagonist Handmaid of this book, Offred (“belonging to Fred”), lives
under harsh violations of her liberty in consequence of being female in a
society that subordinates female persons. 30 Offred reports sexual desires
that extend beyond the leave-me-alone negative half of an autonomy
binary.
For Christopher, the unsettling—and arguably harmful or selfdestructive—wishes of Offred in fiction and human beings in real life
deserve respect because they originate in autonomy of a different sort, the
other half of liberty. MacKinnon’s focus on sex as violation, Christopher
writes, “too greatly diminishes our positive autonomy.” 31 That focus
“protects our negative autonomy exceedingly well. But it not only violates
our positive autonomy, it nearly completely eliminates it.”32
The Third Cohort: Vulnerabilities of Institutions Obliged to Comply
with Title IX of the Civil Rights Act
Institutions of higher learning that cannot personally experience a sexual
assault or an unjust accusation of misconduct are categorically different
from persons vulnerable to sexual assault and persons vulnerable to
accusations of sexual assault. Entities have “no soul to damn, no body to
kick.”33 Yet they matter, here in the Symposium as elsewhere: half the
Articles assembled here focus on them. Concluding with this cohort pays a
closing tribute to the person who envisioned this Symposium. Recall that
victim impact statements for Erin Sheley “transmit to the public the lived
reality of something that may not seem intellectually plausible: sexual
assault by an entity.”34
Hannah Brenner Johnson, Sarah Swan, Kelly Behre, and Erin Buzuvis
build on Sheley’s view that entities are responsible for some of the sexual
assaults that occur on their campuses. Commendably, in my view, all four
30. MARGARET ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID’S TALE (First Anchor Books Movie Tie-In ed.
2017) (1986).
31. Christopher, supra note 22, at 171.
32. Id.
33. John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 (1981); see also
Sheley, supra note 5, at 213 (blaming “a lack of imagination” for the tendency of
corporations to escape punishment).
34. Sheley, supra note 5, at 226.
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authors cite recent litigation in their Articles. Their interest in law on the
ground brings immediacy to writings that also deliver nuance and original
thinking. Just as Sheley and Fields espouse no partisan agreement with
stances taken by persons vulnerable to sexual predation and Dripps and
Christopher do not side categorically with accused persons over accusers,
the four Articles in this concluding third of the Symposium are
emphatically not advocating for the Title IX interests of colleges and
universities. Indeed, they each separately want more accountability for
these institutions. Accountability for colleges and universities amounts to
vulnerability. 35
Reading Title IX to Protect Non-Students Present on Campus
Hannah Brenner Johnson leads with Doe v. University of Kentucky,36 a
decision that considers whether rights and entitlements provisioned to
students in Title IX extend to persons on campus who are not enrolled. 37 In
advocating a yes answer to that question some of the time, Brenner Johnson
has in mind individuals who exhibit traits in common with enrolled
35. Consider, for example, the so-called “Dear Colleague Letter” imposed on this cohort
in 2011. Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.
(Apr. 4, 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. In it
the federal Department of Education told Title IX-covered institutions to use a relatively low
standard of proof for sexual harassment and sexual violence claims. See id. A firestorm
ensued, and in 2017 the Department under a new presidential administration withdrew much
of this guidance. See generally Peter C. Anderson, Note, The Evidentiary Standard in
Collegiate Sexual Assault Proceedings During the Trump Administration, 22 J. GENDER,
RACE & JUST. 107 (2019) (exploring consequences of this development for institutions).
Having to tell the Department of Education each year how many campus rapes were reported
to them presumably stirs discomfort among university managers because a relatively high
score threatens to alienate prospective students. See Editorial, Admit Enrollment Is
Chronically Down Because of Rape, MONTANA KAIMIN (Oct. 14, 2015),
http://www.|montanakaimin.com/opinion/admit-enrollment-is-chronically-down-because-ofrape/article_5cda5d6c-7142-11e5-845a-b39fa41e6dbe.html (adverting, in a student
newspaper, to reports of rape as depressing enrollment at a flagship university); cf. Libby
Nelson, Ranking Colleges Based on Reported Campus Rapes Is a Horrible, Dangerous Idea,
VOX (June 8, 2016, 4:00 PM EDT), https://www.vox.com/2016/6/8/11879626/collegesmost-rapes-ranked (urging consumers not to infer much from a low or a high number
because low can mean reporting is discouraged and high can show confidence among
complainants that they will be heeded) (“Rape statistics aren’t just misleading—they’re
meaningless.”).
36. 357 F. Supp. 3d 620 (E.D. Ky. 2019).
37. See Hannah Brenner Johnson, Standing In Between Sexual Violence Victims and
Access to Justice: The Limits of Title IX, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 15 (2020).
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students, her phrase “campus visitors (non-students)” implies peers, friends,
and colleagues of the matriculated population. 38 The pseudonymous
plaintiff who sought redress from the University of Kentucky “lived on
campus,” “was involved in campus life,” and, perhaps most important, had
a rental agreement for her dormitory room that required her to abide by
university codes that governed students. 39
Brenner Johnson argues that the Kentucky federal trial court erred when
it ruled in favor of the university and against this plaintiff. “Colleges and
universities, while reliant on the presence of and tuition generated by their
enrolled students, cannot entirely depend on insiders to succeed,” Brenner
Johnson explains.40 Instead, “[t]hese educational institutions actively solicit,
depend on, and profit from engagement with outsiders every single day to
fulfill their educational mission.”41 From here, the court continued to err
when it said that the plaintiff lacked standing. That’s not what standing
means, Brenner Johnson argues. 42
Standing as a barrier to relief rests on a concern that permitting this
plaintiff to prosecute a claim threatens the quality of a judicial decision. 43
No such danger is present when visitors who suffer sexual assault seek
redress under Title IX. These outsiders are in a sense insiders, because their
presence on campus advances the purpose and goals of the institution.
“Although colleges and universities are bound by their own unique rules
and norms and exist somewhat like communities within a broader
community,” Brenner Johnson writes, “they require a steady stream of
outsiders to meet their stated educational objectives.”44
Discrimination in the Enforcement of Title IX
Articles by Sarah Swan and Kelly Behre come together under this
heading. Continuing chronologically from where Hannah Brenner Johnson
left off—the entrance point to making a complaint—Sarah Swan addresses
38. Id.
39. Id. at 25–26 (citing Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d at 621–22, 631–32).
40. Id. at 20.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 30–32.
43. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to “Accidental” Plaintiffs:
Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010)
(“Moreover, standing enhances the quality of judicial decisions expounding federal law by
ensuring that they are made in the context of a concrete dispute between adverse parties with
a genuine stake in the outcome—not a mere intellectual or ideological interest in the law.”).
44. Brenner Johnson, supra note 37, at 32.
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the resolution of complaints that universities receive from persons alleging
injury. 45 Echoing Donald Dripps’ identification of both over- and underenforcement of rape crimes, Swan posits two types of error here: unfairness
to accused persons and unfairness to accusers. And similar to how Dripps
united his two problems under one banner, vagueness, Swan applies one
label on this two-sided wrong: “discriminatory dualism.”46
Swan finds analogies in other pairings of both too much and too little
doled out to a subordinated group. My favorite of her illustrations is
mortgage lending. African American candidates for home loans experienced
first too little credit, in the era of redlining (a problem that continues) and,
more recently, too much credit, when predatory lenders targeted them for
exploitative mortgages. 47 In the Title IX version of discriminatory dualism,
Swan argues that “many schools continue to participate in the historical
tradition of mishandling campus sexual assault allegations and skewing
Title IX procedures against complainants,” while “other schools have
recently moved in the opposite direction.”48
I admire Swan’s construct of discriminatory dualism, and commend her
brilliant recent article that explains the phenomenon and backs it with
stunning evidence. 49 Her Title IX application of the construct is, to this
reader, less well supported. In contrast to bias against victims of sexual
assault (a group in which we can include persons who both do and do not
report or complain), which scholars have described in well-documented
research,50 bias that harms respondents is reported only in writings
published outside of academic journals that lament what Swan calls
“overcorrection.”51 Swan gives a respectful read to “Fairness for All
Students Under Title IX,” an essay by Elizabeth Bartholet, Nancy Gertner,
45. Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism in Process: Title IX, Reverse Title IX, and
Sexual Assault, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 69 (2020).
46. Id. at 74.
47. Id.; see also KEEANGA-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR, RACE FOR PROFIT : HOW BANKS AND THE
REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNERSHIP (2019) (positing, in a
historical context, the wrong of “predatory inclusion”).
48. Swan, supra note 45, at 79.
49. Sarah L. Swan, Discriminatory Dualism, 54 GA. L. REV. 869 (2020). Swan’s readers
also await “Marrying Discriminatory Dualism.” See Swan, supra note 45, at 75 n.29.
50. For a recent overview of the record, see Tara N. Richards, No Evidence of
“Weaponized Title IX” Here: An Empirical Assessment of Sexual Misconduct Reporting,
Case Processing, and Outcomes, 43 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 180, 181 (2019).
51. See Swan, supra note 45, at 73 n.19 (citing three popular articles found by
symposium contributor Erin Buzuvis).
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Janet Halley, and Jeannie Suk Gersen, 52 that got dubbed The Revolt of the
Feminist Law Profs in a Chronicle of Higher Education story.53 The claim
in the Chronicle essay is that even feminists, not just rearguard defenders of
male prerogative, now think Title IX resolution has gone too far in crediting
accusations and punishing accused persons.54
Maybe it has and maybe it hasn’t. I’d like to see the evidence. I do not
doubt that Title IX enforcement has treated some number of accused
individuals unfairly and reached some wrong results. The same could be
said about every dispute resolution mechanism ever used anywhere. Both
sexual predation and being accused of sexual predation are unpleasant
experiences; adding institutional attention fuels this fire. 55 After centuries of
no remedy for sexual assault, the dawn of a new-ish era where respondents
as well as victims are made to suffer is a setback for the respondent half of
the binary.
Enter lamentations over due process, covered separately by Swan and
Kelly Behre. In their essay Bartholet, Gertner, Halley, and Gersen
complained that Title IX procedures have denied accused persons powers
and opportunities they want, including confrontation of their accusers, the
assistance of counsel, appeals of adverse results, and a high hurdle of proof
before penalties may ensue.56 Swan reviews two cases. 57 “Contrary to
popular rhetoric,” counters Professor Behre, “students responding to
complaints of student code violations involving sexual misconduct (as well
as dating violence, domestic violence, and stalking) do not have fewer due

52. Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Fairness for All Students Under Title IX (Aug. 21, 2017),
https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33789434/Fairness%20for%20All%20Students.
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
53. Wesley Yang, The Revolt of the Feminist Law Profs: Jeannie Suk Gersen and the
Fight to Save Title IX from Itself, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Aug. 7, 2019), https://www.
chronicle.com/interactives/20190807-feminist-law-profs.
54. Id.
55. Adjudication will now and then lob a bit of good news to a plaintiff or defendant, I
once wrote, but more often “it makes people feel like losers.” Bernstein, Communities, supra
note 26, at 739.
56. See Yang, supra note 53.
57. Swan, supra note 45, at 79–80 (reviewing Doe v. Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d 652 (7th
Cir. 2019)); id. at 80 (reviewing the disciplinary proceedings of Francisco Sousa at San
Diego State University).
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process rights than students responding to other types of student code
violations. They have more.”58
Sexual misconduct occupies only a tiny percentage of behaviors
proscribed in student codes. 59 Students may not rape or stalk, but they also
may not commit theft, (nonsexual) assault, vandalism, illicit drug use,
underage drinking, academic cheating, on and on. 60 For generations, those
who broke these campus rules have been punished,61 and if any of them had
the chance to question their accusers or hire a lawyer or gain timely process
or attack anyone’s credibility, what they enjoyed was a grace or privilege
rather than a right.62 But when the misbehavior is sexual, due process for
the accused is apt to kick in. Behre gives a close read to Doe v. Allee, a
recent decision holding that students accused of sexual misconduct within
California colleges and universities have due process rights—rights that are
not held by students accused of other code violations. 63
Toward More Accountability: Official Policy Liability
Erin Buzuvis boldly suggests that universities might have “official
policies of indifference to sexual misconduct.”64 Not deliberate
indifference, a different standard on which claims tend to founder, 65 but a
policy of proceeding as if risks don’t exist and declining to learn about
sources of danger.66 When institutions take a stance of disbelief in the
reality of this danger at a point when reasonable people would guard against
it, their posture can fairly be called their policy.
Professor Buzuvis’s Article nicely illustrates the pattern I have found in
the symposium: To understand the point of view held by a cohort is not
58. Kelly Alison Behre, Rape Exceptionalism Comes to California: Institutionalizing
the Credibility Discount of College Students Reporting Sexual Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L.
REV. 101, 109 (2020) (footnote omitted).
59. Id. at 107.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 106 n.27.
63. Id. at 102–05 (discussing Doe v. Allee, 242 Cal. Rptr. 3d 109 (Ct. App. 2019)).
64. Erin E. Buzuvis, Title IX and Official Policy Liability: Maximizing the Law’s
Potential to Hold Education Institutions Accountable for Their Responses to Sexual
Misconduct, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 35, 36 (2020).
65. “Deliberate indifference” as a Title IX judicial standard comes from Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 291 (1998), and Davis v. Monroe County
Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999). See also Buzuvis, supra note 64, at 40–41
nn. 29–30, 36.
66. Buzuvis, supra note 64, at 42–43, 51–53.
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necessarily to side with that cohort in litigation. More overtly than the other
three writers who address the third cohort, Buzuvis wants to make
universities more vulnerable to Title IX liability, not less. To Buzuvis,
decisional law from 2016–2018 that accepted official policy liability points
forward:67 “[O]fficial policy liability possesses untapped potential for
leveraging Title IX to hold educational institutions accountable for
instances of sexual assault and misconduct.”68
Conclusion
“Untapped potential,” the phrase applied three lines ago to an emerging
doctrinal development, 69 also awaits in the works gathered in this
Symposium. As contributors have shown, consent as an element of doctrine
present in the resolution of sexual assault claims engages three cohorts.
First, persons vulnerable to sexual predation might have consented to what
they experienced. Second, persons accused of sexual predation might have
engaged in what criminal law calls an actus reus without consent. Third,
institutions tasked with adjudicating or otherwise processing accusations of
sexual predation might have to determine the presence or absence of
consent.
Authors gathered in these pages have identified these three cohorts while
not necessarily identifying with them. Persons vulnerable to sexual
predation, persons vulnerable to accusations of sexual predation, and
institutions obliged to comply with Title IX of the Civil Rights Act form a
triangle of responsibility and redress. 70 This Symposium gives us not only
recommendations on what the law ought to provide but an anatomy of
stakeholders and consequences. 71

67. See id. at 60 n.153 (citing Doe v. Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 654–56 (W.D.
Tex. 2017); Doe v. Baylor Univ., 336 F. Supp. 3d 763, 769–70 (W.D. Tex. 2018)); see also
Doe v. Univ. of Tenn., 186 F. Supp. 3d 788, 807 (M.D. Tenn. 2016).
68. Buzuvis, supra note 64, at 67.
69. See id.
70. I borrow the phrase from a casebook title. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG ET AL., TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS (4th ed. 2016).
71. Elsewhere I have explored the accuser-accused-adjudicator/observer triad at greater
length. See Bernstein, Aggression, supra note 26.
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